clothing, expertise, and in-kind contributions to assist the victims and the rescue efforts.
These behaviors are not unexpected in times of disaster, according to the sociological literature. In fact, although the general public and officials may expect negative behaviors such as looting during disasters, research demonstrates that altruism and prosocial behavior is much more common and normal at such times (Fischer, 1994; Tierney, 2001) . Raphael (1986) suggests that such impulses may be genetic, in that altruism is a drive that may be brought to the surface during an emergency to assist in the survival of the group or species. These impulses promote the growth and convergence of formal and informal infrastructures, such as emergency funds, to assist in the recovery efforts. In the case of the September 11 terrorist attacks, some of these funds (e.g., American Red Cross) already existed, and others, such as the September 11 Fund, were rapidly developed. The feelings of altruism were so strong in the immediate posteffect period that individuals, businesses, and foundations contributed funds at a level unprecedented in previous disasters (Rooney, 2002) . By December 31, 2001 (3½ months after the attacks), an estimated $1.9 billion had been received for the relief and recovery efforts (AAFRC Trust, 2002) .
As the dust began to settle 6 months after the attacks, the philanthropic community began to take stock of the donations made in the relief efforts. Both the New York and the Washington, D.C., Regional Associations of Grantmakers published reports of the philanthropic efforts in their communities to that point (Cox, 2002; Washington Regional Association of Grantmakers, 2002) . Organizations in other major cities also released reports on the effect of the September 11 events on nonprofits in their communities (e.g., Donors Forum of Chicago, 2002) .
At the national level, the Foundation Center kept a continuous record, posted on its Web site, of corporate and foundation contributions to tragedyrelated causes. They also produced a number of reports providing analysis and commentary on the effect of the September 11 events (Foundation Center, 2002; Renz, 2002a Renz, , 2002b . In addition, the Association of Fundraising Professionals (2002) published a report on a survey of nonprofit development officers with regard to the effect of the 9/11 events on fund-raising in charities across the country. The Ford Foundation also commissioned a study involving interviews with officials from foundations and corporations that made large donations to the relief efforts (Seessel, 2002) .
The contributions of individual households are less well-documented in general, in relation both to the September 11 attacks and to other disasters. In fact, whereas emergency volunteer behavior relating to other disasters has received some previous attention in the academic literature (e.g., Britton, 1991; Wolensky, 1979) , very little attention has been paid in the past to the financial contributions of individuals in response to disasters. However, a few studies were conducted shortly after the September 11 events to document the phil-
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anthropic behavior of individual households in response to this particular tragedy. One national survey (Schuster et al., 2001) conducted September 14 to 19, 2001 , reported that 36% of the adults surveyed responded to the attack on America by making donations. Another survey by the National Opinion Research Center (Smith, Rasinski, & Toce, 2001 ) fielded in the immediate posteffect period (September 13 to 27) found that, at that time, "almost half (49%) contributed to charities, 24 percent donated or tried to donate blood, and 8 percent did extra volunteer work for an organization. A full 59 percent did at least one of these actions" (p. 9). These studies were conducted very soon after the tragedy, so that the percentages are smaller than those seen in later studies.
In a separate poll conducted October 5 to 8, 2001 , Independent Sector (2001b found that more than half (58%) gave money to charities in response to the terrorist attacks in the 4 weeks just after September 11. Also, 13% gave blood and 11% gave time. Overall, 70% of Americans reported charitable involvement in some way (p. 4). In addition, a poll conducted by USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup on December 14 to 16, 2001 16, (Nasser, 2001 , found that 64% of respondents reported making contributions to funds for the victims.
None of these studies attempted to measure the amounts of giving and volunteering Americans contributed after the events of September 11. However, the percentages reported in these studies generally are consistent with and help to verify the results in our study. Taken together, these results lead us toward the emerging picture of the philanthropic behavior of Americans in the first few weeks and months following the tragedy.
METHOD
At the time of the September 11 attacks, the Center on Philanthropy was conducting a multipronged, national research study on individual and household philanthropy of Americans. We refer to this study as "America Gives." This project was an extension of an earlier, smaller study done in Indiana (Rooney, Steinberg, & Schervish, 2001; . In the America Gives study, we compared and contrasted the findings from different survey techniques related to giving and volunteering behaviors. The main purpose of that study was to explore whether the length and variety of prompts made a difference in reported giving and volunteering.
The America Gives study involved five different survey modules, which are summarized in Table 1 . Among these, we replicated central design elements of surveys done in the United States by Independent Sector (1999) (the Area module) and in Canada (Hall, McKeown, & Roberts, 2001 ) (Method module). Another module (Method-Area) used an enhancement of the methodology used in a survey in California, described by O'Neill and Roberts (2000) . Another module replicated a survey module designed by the University of Michigan and the Center on Philanthropy for a longitudinal study, the
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Steinberg, Rooney Table 1 summarizes the modules by the types of prompts, the number of questions, and use of inducements. Note that all modules included the exact same set of 16 demographic questions. To collect our data, Walker Information, an Indianapolis-based research firm, used random digit dialing of households to obtain samples of at least 800 respondents per module, using the five surveys to measure personal philanthropy throughout the United States. Each respondent participated in only one of the modules. Table 2 shows the demographic characteristics of each module subsample and the total sample. We discuss briefly only those sample characteristics that are statistically significantly different from the combined or total sample. Compared with the total sample means and proportions, the Very Short module contained significantly more Blacks (10.4% vs. 8.1% overall). The PSID had more couples (64.3% vs. 61.5% overall). The Area module had slightly fewer households with incomes in excess of $120,000 (5.2% vs. 5.8%). The Method module had fewer couples (58.5% vs. 61.5%), a larger percentage with incomes of $40,000 or less (47.9% vs. 42.4% overall), a smaller percentage of high incomes (5.1% vs. 5.8%), and a concomitant smaller percentage who itemized their deductions (45.9% vs. 49.8%). The Method-Area module did not differ from the overall sample in any significant manner.
We used $5 prepaid phone cards as inducements to increase response rates. Previous research (Rooney et al., 2001) indicated that inducements were particularly effective in increasing response rates in the longest (Method-Area) module, so we gave phone cards to 75% of the respondents in that module. We also gave phone cards to at least 10% of respondents in the other modules. The number of inducements for each module is shown in Table 1. SURVEY AND METHODOLOGICAL MODIFICATIONS TO ACCOMMODATE THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS Calling for America Gives began August 1, 2001, and thus the project was "in the field" when the terrorist attacks occurred on September 11. Due to the unusual and emotional nature of this event, we immediately suspended calling for 4 weeks. Because our study was partially completed, we were faced with a choice: stop the project and only use the data collected at that point, or attempt to continue the study. We quickly realized that the terrorist attacks provided a natural, although unfortunate, experiment in philanthropic behavior on a national scale. Furthermore, we felt that the Center on Philanthropy was in a unique position to study this philanthropic behavior because we already had collected data on giving and volunteering immediately prior to the attacks. The opportunity to study personal philanthropy both before and after a significant national event was too important to forsake, despite the tragic circumstances.
Within 2 days of the attacks, support in the form of donations from the public began pouring in. We realized that our major dependent variables (charitable giving and volunteering in the past year) would be confounded with tragedy-related giving. That is, respondents' total reported donations and volunteer hours might be increased because of the tragedy. To accommodate this situation, we added a new variable in our data set to indicate whether respondents were contacted before or after September 11. In addition, we added six extra questions to all modules to query philanthropic behavior specifically related to the tragedy. We were aware that by changing the nature of the surveys midstream, we might contaminate the results of our original study, particularly if the tragedy-related questions were added to the beginning of each module. On the other hand, we reasoned that because of the differences in length and detail and the modules, responses to the tragedyAmericans' Generosity After September 11 115 related questions might not be complete, reliable, or have the same meaning across modules if they were appended to the end of each module. We decided to add the tragedy-related questions to the beginning of all modules. Respondents then were instructed not to include those donations and volunteer hours in the rest of their responses. We hoped this strategy would minimize the differences in reported giving after September 11 to non-September 11 causes. We also were confronted with another possible confound to the study, because the calling for two of the modules (Very Short and Area) had already been completed prior to September 11. Calling for the other three modules had been started but was in various stages of completion. The events of September 11 were of such significance that we felt our modules might not be directly comparable. To deal with this problem, we had two options: (a) contact some of the respondents again from the already-completed Very Short and Area modules and ask about their tragedy donations separately, or (b) add more respondents to the already-completed subsamples. Due to the difficulties involved in interviewing exactly the same people twice, we chose the second option. These extra respondents received the extra tragedy-related questions, along with the regular module questions. Table 1 indicates the number of respondents interviewed pre-and post-September 11 for each module.
A third potential confounding factor related to the new dependent variables coming from the tragedy questions (tragedy-related giving and volunteering) and the original design of the study. We reasoned that the amount of household donations and personal volunteering related to the tragedy could increase over time. That is, the longer the time lapse between September 11 and the date on which a respondent was called, the higher his or her tragedyrelated donations might be. Thus, one module sample might report significantly higher giving and volunteering than another sample, simply because they were completed at different times. Therefore, it was important to begin and end the posttragedy calling for all modules at approximately the same time. Specifically, we ended all calling before the end of November, to avoid the typical seasonal increase in giving in December.
HYPOTHESES AND ANALYSES
Our first level of data analysis was descriptive. We looked at percentages of those who responded to the tragedy with charitable behavior, the types of donative activity, and the amounts contributed.
Due to the nature of this study, we needed to test some hypotheses about our sample before we could draw any conclusions about giving and volunteering behavior in the wake of this national tragedy. These hypotheses were as follows:
Hypothesis 1: There were no significant differences between pre-and postSeptember 11 samples in terms of demographics.
Steinberg, Rooney
If supported, this hypothesis would allow us to conclude that the events of September 11 did not play a significant role in determining who would be willing to respond to a telephone survey on household philanthropy. Thus, any reported differences in giving and volunteering would be attributable to other factors than differences in the pre-and post-subsamples. We used t tests to analyze this hypothesis. In addition to Hypothesis 1, we developed three hypotheses to test whether we would be able to aggregate our data across modules for purposes of analysis of the tragedy-related questions. If supported, Hypothesis 2 would allow us to conclude that the demographics of our module subsamples were similar enough that we could combine them for the rest of the analyses. Hypotheses 3 and 4, if supported, would indicate that the module used along with the tragedy questions had no effect on reports of tragedy-related giving or volunteering. These hypotheses are not the main focus of this article and therefore we present them in more detail in the Appendix.
In addition to these four hypotheses related to the design of our study, we developed several hypotheses concerning giving and volunteering behavior in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Hypothesis 5: There were significant differences in tragedy-related giving, based on demographic factors such as income, education, and so on. Hypothesis 6: There were significant differences in tragedy-related volunteering, based on demographic factors. Hypothesis 7: There were significant differences in other types of charitable support (e.g., blood, food, clothing) related to the tragedy, based on demographic factors.
In particular, based on previous research in the field of philanthropy (e.g., Bennett & Kottasz, 2000; Rooney et al., 2001) , we expected that income, education, and religiosity might be significant determinants of charitable giving related to the tragedy. We expected that gender and religiosity might be significant determinants of tragedy-related volunteering (Independent Sector, 2001a; Mesch, Rooney, Chin, & Steinberg, 2002) and that other types of charitable donations (food, blood, etc.) might also be determined by demographic variables. We used multivariate (regression) methods for analyzing these three hypotheses. The next two hypotheses relate to nontragedy (general) giving and volunteering before and after the September 11 attacks. We were interested in investigating whether different groups changed their giving and volunteering behavior in response to the terrorist attacks.
Hypothesis 8: Some groups of people changed their overall giving in response to the events of September 11. Hypothesis 9: Some groups of people changed their volunteering in response to the events of September 11.
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Note that the dependent variables for these two hypotheses are different from those of the previous hypotheses (i.e., general rather than tragedy-related giving and volunteering). We used t tests, regressions, and Chow tests to examine these hypotheses.
RESULTS

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Our first level of analysis was descriptive in nature. Our survey demonstrated that Americans were very generous in their response to the September 11 events. Of the people surveyed, 74.4% responded to the tragedy with some form of charitable behavior-giving money; giving food, clothing, blood; and/or giving volunteer hours to help the victims. Among those who responded to the tragedy by giving or volunteering, participation rates were as follows: 51.6% responded with only one of these types of charitable activity, 19.8% participated in two of them, and 3.0% participated in all three forms of philanthropy, as shown in Figure 1 .
Financial Donations to the Relief Efforts
Of the adults surveyed, 65.6% said they or their household made financial contributions to charities for the victims of the tragedy. There was a wide outpouring of support, mostly in small donations. Among contributing households, the average donation was $133.72. The median was $50 and 74% gave $100 or less. Looking at all households in the survey (including those that did not make donations), the average contribution was $85.41 and the median was $25.00. In addition to monetary support to aid the victims, Americans were generous in other types of giving. Of the adults surveyed, 27.2% indicated that they made other donations to the relief effort, such as clothing, food and water, or blood. As shown in Table 3 , people who made this type of donation were significantly more likely (χ 2 = 5.451, p = .021) to donate money than people who did not donate items such as food, clothing, or blood.
Volunteering to Help the Victims
Of those surveyed, 8.4% indicated that they performed voluntary service to help the victims of the tragedy. The average volunteer donated nearly 17 hours of time. The median level was 8 hours. Volunteers were significantly Americans' Generosity After September 11 119 more likely than nonvolunteers to make donations of money (χ 2 = 8.251, p = .004) or other types of donations such as food, clothing, or blood (χ 2 = 15.523, p = .000) (see Table 3 ). This is consistent with previous research (Hall et al., 2001; Independent Sector, 1999; Jalandoni & Hume, 2001; Steinberg et al., 2002) that has shown that volunteers are more likely to donate than nonvolunteers. A number of economic researchers (e.g., Andreoni, Gale, & Scholz, 1996; Brown & Lankford, 1992; Duncan, 1999) have studied the question of the interdependence between charitable donations of money and time, but this research focuses on annual contributions as affected by tax treatments. We are not aware of any previous studies that look at joint response of donations of time and money to some specific external event.
ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES
Demographics of the pre-and post-September 11 samples are shown in Table 4 . Comparing the two samples, the percentage of Black respondents was significantly lower (t = 2.889, p = .004) and the percentage of respondents with a bachelor's degree was significantly higher (t = -3.937, p = .000) in the posttragedy sample. Although minority households have sometimes been underrepresented in surveys of household giving (e.g., Rooney et al., 2000) , we knew of no reason that the events of September 11 would have negatively affected the willingness of Blacks, and positively affected the willingness of college graduates, to respond to the survey. In the absence of any other explanation, we concluded that these differences were an artifact of the random sample and that the two samples were similar enough in other ways to draw conclusions based on pooled data.
Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 were designed to test whether we would be able to aggregate our data across modules for purposes of analysis of the tragedyrelated questions. All three hypotheses were supported. Because these hypotheses are not the main focus of this article, we present these results in the Appendix. Our next three hypotheses concerned the determinants of giving and volunteering in response to the events of September 11.
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We tested Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7 in a multivariate framework, applying our traditional tools (ordinary least squares [OLS] , Probit, and Tobit) to the amount of giving and volunteering that was related specifically to September 11 causes. We explain donations of time and money in regression frameworks by including a set of dummy variables for the five modules, along with the demographic variables. If there are pure module (survey or prompting) effects, they will show up as significant coefficients for the module dummy variables.
Unfortunately, the error terms in these regressions do not obey the classical assumptions that justify the exclusive use of OLS regressions. Donations cannot be negative, so the error term has a truncated distribution. In addition, giving and volunteering data appears to have a nonnormal (heteroskedastic) error structure (e.g., Bradley, Holden, & McClelland, 1999; Rooney et al., 2001; Steinberg et al., 2002) . Under these circumstances, OLS is biased and inconsistent. Tobit regression models, on the other hand, do not generate negative predicted donations. Unfortunately, Tobit models are not robust to nonnormal (heteroskedastic) errors. An additional problem with Tobit models is that they enforce a proportionality between a variable's effect on the probability of giving and the size of the donation for those who give. Another approach, a twoAmericans' Generosity After September 11 121 stage Heckman model, solves this latter problem but is not robust to nonnormality. Because there is no commonly accepted ideal remedy for all of these problems, we conducted four different approaches (Tobit, Heckman two-stage, OLS on the full sample, and OLS on positive donors only), in the hope that a consistent picture would emerge. We also ran Probit models to assess the effects of the various survey modules on the probability of donating or volunteering at all. To simplify the presentation here, we focus our discussion on the Tobit models and Probit models. A complete set of results, including the OLS and Heckman two-stage models, is available from the authors upon request.
1 Our regression models use levels rather than logarithms for the continuous variables, for several reasons. First, it significantly simplifies the interpretation of the results, which is helpful for a broad interdisciplinary readership. Second, given the nature of the analyses, the large number of zeros (i.e., nondonors and/or nonvolunteers) lends itself to using level data with Tobit analyses. Finally, many of our main variables of interest are dichotomous or multichotomous in nature, so we chose linear forms for simplicity.
As shown in Table 5 , we found that the only significant variable in explaining differences in dollars donated was earnings: middle-income earners ($40,000-$80,000) gave $29 (OLS and $28 in Tobit) more than low-income earners, and high-income earners ($80,000+) gave almost $75 (OLS and $55 more in Tobit) more to September 11 causes than did low-income earners. These results are consistent with much previous research in the field of philanthropy (e.g., Bennett & Kottasz, 2000; Rooney et al., 2001) , which shows that income is a significant determinant of charitable giving. As we might expect, given that we asked the tragedy-related giving questions at the beginning of the interview and all interviewees were given the same questions, none of the module variables were significant at traditional levels. The results for dollars given were similar when we used Tobits.
Our Probit results found that middle-income and high-income households were respectively 26% and 25% more likely than low-income households to report making any gifts to September 11 causes. The only other variables that attained significant levels in the Probit analysis were the age variables (age and its squared term). These suggest that the probability of making any September 11 gifts increased slightly with each year of age but at a decreasing rate.
Turning to volunteering for September 11-related activities, we found that respondents who had volunteered in the previous year donated significantly more hours, on average, than those who had not, F(1, 1286) = 10.377, p = .001. Using regression analysis (see Table 6 ), we found that religiosity was a strong predictor of September 11 volunteering. Those who attended a religious service at least once a week were 42% more likely to have volunteered for September 11 activities than those who attended less often or did not attend religious services. This is consistent with previous research that shows that religious attendance is a significant determinant of volunteering (e.g., Brown, 1999; Independent Sector, 2001a) . A somewhat surprising result was that
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Steinberg, Rooney those with children in college were 19% more likely to volunteer than those without, but this was only weakly significant (p = .099). Another anomalous result was that the PSID module was 61% less likely to elicit such volunteer activities when compared to the very short module. This result seems to be driven by the relatively few who volunteered, so the actual distribution of volunteers across modules would matter more than in a larger sample. When we looked at the number of hours volunteered for September 11-related causes, we found there were few variables that attained significance and those that did had very small coefficients, suggesting that there were few, if any, consistent patterns of behavior that we could capture with traditional demographic data. Those with at least some college education volunteered almost an hour more than those with a high school degree (or less), but this was only weakly significant (p = .061). Those with children in college volunteered almost an hour more than those without, and those who attended religious services more frequently volunteered slightly more than an hour more than those who did not. We got similar results in the Tobit model, so we do not explore this further. When examining other types of giving to the tragedies (blood, food, clothing), we only asked whether a household had done so, which constrained our analysis to Probit regressions. As shown in Table 7 , men were 6.6% less likely to donate blood, food, or clothing. Those with some college were 5.6% more likely to donate blood, food, or clothing, but this was only weakly significant. Finally, those with middle incomes ($40,000 to $80,000) were 7.2% more likely to make this type of donation than lower income households.
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The next two hypotheses relate to nontragedy (general) giving and volunteering before and after the September 11 attacks.
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We were interested in investigating whether different groups changed their giving and volunteering behavior in response to the terrorist attacks. It is important to note that the dependent variables for these two hypotheses were different from those of the previous hypotheses (i.e., general rather than tragedy-related giving and volunteering). Knowing that the philanthropic reactions to the attack on America may vary by some of the demographic groups, we disaggregated our pre-and post-samples by some of the key demographic factors and tested these differences a couple of ways. First, we conducted t tests for pre and post differences in unconditional means. Then, we ran regressions that included a dichotomous variable for the respondents surveyed after September 11, to see whether sampling before or after September 11 affected the coefficient of mean giving (controlling for income, education, race, etc.). Finally, we compared the log-likelihood values and conducted Chow tests to see whether inclusion of the pre-post-dummy sufficed or whether September 11 affected Americans' Generosity After September 11 125 all the other coefficients as well. Although it would have been preferred to survey the exact same households pre-and post-September 11, these regressions provide critical insights into whether September 11 is associated with changes in philanthropic behaviors. We first examined whether there were differences in the unconditional means for pre-and post-September 11 samples (see Table 8 ). We found that all demographic groups reported more donations after September 11, although not all of the differences were statistically significant. Respondents who were White, low-income (less than $40,000 per year), high income ($80,000 or more per year), tax itemizers, or who attended religious services at least once a week reported significantly higher levels of donations after September 11 than before the tragedy. Respondents with some college education (but no degree) volunteered significantly more following September 11. There were no other statistically significant differences in the mean levels of volunteering by any of the various demographic groups. Table 9 shows the results of the Tobit and Probit regressions, in which we examined the effect on the conditional means of being sampled before or after September 11, for each demographic group. In this table, the Tobit estimates indicate the amount (in dollars or hours) that post-September 11 giving/ volunteering by each group differed from pre-event giving/volunteering.
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Steinberg, Rooney The Probit estimates measure the increase in the probability that members of each group became donors as a result of September 11. Using these regression methods, we found no statistically significant differences (at p < .05) in reported amounts donated pre-versus post-September 11 (see Table 9 ). However, the events of September 11 did increase the probability of reporting donations for several groups. Respondents who were White or other races (but not Black), low-income, itemizers, had some college experience, or attended church services at least once a week were more likely to report making a donation (at least $1) following the events of September 11.
We also found several significant effects in estimating pre-and postSeptember 11 volunteering in our Probit and Tobit frameworks (see Table 9 ). A larger number of volunteer hours were reported after September 11 by respondents who were White, low-income, married, itemizers, had some college education, or attended religious services at least once a week. These same groups were also more likely to report volunteering post-September 11, along with middle-income households ($40,000-$80,000 per year) and respondents with a college degree.
Finally, we conducted Chow tests to test whether the inclusion of the dichotomous variable for post-September 11 respondents improved the overall estimation of the models. For example, among low-income households, we found very strong evidence for both the Tobit (chow test = 2097.8; critical value .005 = 32.8) and the Probit (chow test = 539.0; critical value .005 = 32.8) that there were differences in the pre-and post-giving patterns. Although the chow test scores are smaller for our volunteering analyses, we still find relatively large improvements in both the Tobit (chow = 42.3; critical value .05 = 26.29) and the Probit (chow = 37.9; critical value .05 = 26.29). These results lend additional credence to the use of pre-post-subsamples among different demographic groups, thus supporting our conclusion that the pattern of giving for some groups of people was different after the events of September 11, 2001.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our results show that most households (74.4%) responded to the September 11 attacks on America with some form of charitable behavior-giving money; giving food, clothing, and blood; and/or giving volunteer hours to help the victims. Of the adults surveyed, 65.6% said that they or their household made financial contributions to the relief efforts. Most of these donations were made fairly quickly, within the first few months following the tragedy, and most of the contributions were relatively small, particularly in comparison to foundation and corporate donations. For example, among contributing households, the average gift was $133.72 and the median was $50.00. Looking at all households in the survey (including those that did not make a contribution), the mean was $85.40 and the median was $25.00.
The $133.72 average gift found by the survey was higher than might be expected. The median gift of $50.00 may be more representative of giving by most Americans in response to September 11. We hypothesize that several factors may have played a role in raising the amount of the average gift. For example, the simple random sample that was used (originally designed for the different purposes of the larger survey) overrepresented certain groups of donors who tend to report higher-than-average donations on other surveys of giving. Also, respondents reported several large gifts, ranging from $800 to $5,000, which raised the average.
In addition, some respondents may have overreported the amounts that they gave (reporting amounts higher than they actually gave), perhaps because they wanted to feel more a part of the intense emotional and patriotic outpouring of support in response to the horrific events of September 11. Some of the gifts reported may be donations respondents intended to make but for which they had not yet actually sent a contribution at the time of the survey. Finally, although the survey specifically asked about giving to the victims of September 11, some of the gifts reported may have been given to local organizations for other relief or nonrelief causes in the spirit of responding to the tragedy. The outpouring of giving and media coverage also may have raised awareness of the need for philanthropic giving more generally.
The most important variable in determining the amount of cash donations was household income. The probability of making any September 11 gifts increased slightly with each year of age, but at a decreasing rate. These results are consistent with the previous research on the determinants of giving in general, which shows that household income is the most important factor in decisions about charitable giving.
Turning to voluntary service, 8.4% of those surveyed reported volunteering to help the victims of the tragedy. The average volunteer donated nearly 17 hours of time, and the median level was 8 hours. It is not surprising that few people reported volunteering, given the difficulty of volunteering in this particular tragedy. For example, travel was restricted, volunteering on-site was discouraged early on, and the primary need was for people with very specialized skills.
A significant factor in determining volunteer service to help the tragedy victims was whether a person had done any volunteer work in the previous year. We also found that religiosity (that is, religious attendance at least once a week) was a strong predictor of September 11 volunteering. This is consistent with previous literature on volunteering in general. A somewhat surprising result was that those with children in college were more likely to volunteer than those without. Few variables predicted the number of volunteer hours, suggesting that there were few, if any, consistent patterns of behavior that we could capture with traditional demographic data. The particular circumstances related to the September 11 tragedy were probably so unusual that the typical patterns of volunteering behavior did not apply.
Of the adults surveyed, 27.2% reported making other types of donations after the tragedy, such as blood, food or water, and clothing. We found similar effects for giving blood and so on to the tragedy in the multivariate framework as we did for other types of giving: gender, income, and education made small but significant differences in the probability of making such donations. Donations of this type have not received much emphasis in the research literature, so this represents a special contribution of this study.
When we examined general (nontragedy) giving, we found that several demographic groups (respondents who were White or other races but not Black, low-income, itemizers, had some college experience, or attended church services at least once a week) were more likely to have donated following the attack on America. However, after controlling for income, education, and so on, there was no strong evidence that any of the demographic groups studied gave significantly more money following September 11. On the other hand, a larger number of volunteer hours were reported after September 11 by respondents who were White, low-income, married, itemizers, had some college education, or attended religious services at least once a week. These same groups were also more likely to report volunteering post-September 11, along with middle-income households ($40,000-$80,000 per year) and those with a college degree.
One possible shortcoming of this study is that respondents may have overstated their philanthropy after the events of September 11, in an effort to portray themselves in a more favorable, patriotic light. However, all Americans were affected by the terrorist attacks and any inflation in reporting would most likely affect all groups equally. For this reason, we believe that the differences that we found between groups are real ones.
Overall, our results were consistent with previous findings on the determinants of philanthropic behavior (giving and volunteering) in general. However, there were a number of variables that we were unable to measure that may have played an important role in determining individual and household action in response to this particular tragedy. For example, we did not gather any information on personal feelings of empathy, anger, security, or patriotism, or whether or not respondents had immediate family members or close friends directly affected by the attacks.
The America Gives study was unique because the Center on Philanthropy was in the field gathering data on individual and household philanthropy of Americans at the time of the September 11 attacks. This gave us an opportunity to study personal philanthropy both before and after a significant national event. After the September 11 attacks, many people worried that individual donations to nonprofit organizations would be negatively affectedthat is, that people would donate less money to nonprofits because they had made donations related to the tragedy. Future work with this data set will focus on the question of whether September 11 giving and volunteering crowded out non-September 11 giving and volunteering.
Hypothesis 2 was supported for all demographic variables (see Table A1 ). We concluded that the demographics of our module subsamples were similar enough that we could combine them for purposes of analysis of the tragedy-related questions.
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we decided to exclude from our analyses two outliers who otherwise would have skewed the analysis. One of these was a woman who reported a donation of $65,000 toward tragedy relief-she happened to complete the Method-Area module. (The next-highest response was $5,000.) The other outlier was a woman who volunteered 840 hours to help the victims of the tragedy (equivalent to 10 weeks of 12-hour days, 7 days a week). She completed the PSID module. (The secondhighest response was 200 hours.) Whether the reported values are true or not, they were so different from other responses that they would distort the results, regardless of which module was used.
As shown in Table A2 , both of these hypotheses were supported. There were no significant differences between the subsamples in terms of charitable donations of time or treasure in response to the September 11 tragedy. This held true whether we included all respondents or looked at donors only or volunteers only.
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